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The recent growth, like Jonah's gourd, of the motor bus
industry and the Supreme Court's decisions upon it in the last
few, years, indicate another gap for the filling of which, by the
direct operation of Federal authority, demand is becoming more
and more imperative. In Buck v. Kuykendall,45 and Bush v.
Maloy,4 6 the Supreme Court held that bus lines carrying through
interstate passengers only were not subject to the state commissions' authority in the matter of certificates of public utility
and convenience, holding that the "direct burden" prohibition
*AUTHOR'S NoE: Apropos the Narragansett Electric Light Co. case,
273 U. S. 83 (1927) with which, as a problem in the control of interstate

power companies, the February installment of this paper concluded, attention
is called to the Second Report on the Electrical Industry made to the United
States Senate by the Federal Trade Commission, as given in the United States
Daily, beginning January 23, 1928.

Chapter XIII of the Report discusses the position of companies the extent of whose service areas "transcend the boundaries of individual states"
with the result that in the division of regulatory authority the line of demarcation has not been sharply defined leaving part of a public utility company's
business subject to state regulation, and the remainder to no regulation at all.
The growth of great interconnected systems with a rapid increase in exchanges
of power across state lines, is now forcing this question to an issue.
The report closes with the substantial reiteration of these statements (issue
Jan. 27, p. 9) without further suggestion.
Meanwhile, under Senate Resolution 83, introduced by Senator Walsh
of Montana, the Interstate Commerce Committee of the Senate has been holding hearings. The resolution is that a committee of the Senate be appointed
to inquire into the financial growth and practices of public utilities. The United
States Daily from January 17, reported the progress of the matter which
culminated in the vote to report the resolution, on February i. Possibly there
is here the beginning of a great matter in new Federal activity in this field.
The resolution was amended by the Committee, but in a manner "not unacceptable" to its author. The text is in the issue of the Daily for February 2.
4267 U. S. 307 (1925).
41267 U. S. 317 (1925).
The cases are noted in (1925) i0 CORN. L. Q. 5g9
and (925) 25 Coi. L. REv. 670. They held that the decision whether or not
there were, existing, adequate facilities for interstate transportation was not for
the state.
(548)
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came into play.4 7 The resultant gold rush into the interstate
bus field impelled a prompt consideration of means of Federal
control 4 but the Supreme Court's recent decisions have taught
that state regulation is not wholly negligible meanwhile.
49
In Clark v. Poor, et al., Public Utility Commissioners,
Clark and Riggs operated as common carrier a motor truck line
exclusively in interstate commerce into Cincinnati, ignoring the
Ohio Motor TransportationAct as to certificate of utility and
as to a tax graduated according to the vehicles used. The instant
case arose on their suit to enjoin the Ohio Commission from
enforcing the act, and they failed. Said Brandeis, J., for the
Court:.
"It appeared that, while the act calls the certificate
one of 'public convenience and necessity,' the commission
had recognized, before this suit was begun, that, under
Buck v. Kuykendall, :267 U. S. 307 (1925), and Bush v.
Maloy, 267 U. S. 317 (1925), it had no discretion where the
carrier was engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, and
was willing to grant to plaintiff a certificate upon application and compliance with other provisions of the law.
"The plaintiffs claim that, as applied to them, the act
violates the commerce clause of the federal constitution.
They insist that, as they are engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, they are not subject to regulation by the
state; that it is without power to require that before using
its highways they apply for and obtain a certificate; and
that it is also without power to impose in addition to the
annual license fee demanded of all persons using automobiles on the highways, a tax upon them, under section 61494, for the maintenance and repair of the highways and for
the administration and enforcement of the laws governing
the use of the same. The contrary is settled. The highways are public property. Users of them, although engaged
exclusively in interstate commerce, are subject to regulation
by the state to ensure safety and convenience and the con' See Motor CarrierRegulation: Federal,State, and Municipal, I. S. Rosenbaum and D. E. Lilienthal, (1926) 26 Co.. L. REv. 954; State Highways and
Interstate Motor Transportation, B. C. Gavit, (1927) 21 ILL L. REv. 559. See
also (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 696.

"The Columbia article discusses at page 98o the various proposals for regulating the interstate bus business.
"47 Sup. Ct. 702 (1927).
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servation of the highways. Morris v. Duby, 274 U. S. 135
(927).
Users of them, although engaged exclusively in
interstate commerce, may be required to contribute to their
cost and upkeep. Common carriers for hire, who make the
highways their place of business, may properly be charged
an extra tax for such use.
"Plaintiffs urge that the decree should be reversed because of the provision in the act concerning insurance. The
act provides that no certificate shall be issued until a policy
covering liability and cargo insurance has been filed with the
commission.

Section 614-99.

The lower court held that,

under Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke, 266
U. S. 570 (925), this provision could not be applied to
exclusively interstate carriers, Red Ball Transit Co. v. Marshall, 8 F. (2d) 635, 639 (D. C., 1925); and counsel for
the commission stated in this court that the requirement
for insurance would not be insisted upon.
"It is not clear whether the liability insurance, for
which the act provides, is against loss resulting to third
persons from the applicant's negligence in using the highways within the state, or is for loss to passengers resulting
from such negligence or for both purposes. We have no
occasion to consider whether under any suggested interpretation, liability insurance, as distinguished from insurance
on the interstate cargo, may be required of a carrier engaged wholly in interstate commerce. Compare Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927).

The decree dismissing

the bill is affirmed, but without prejudice to the right of the
plaintiffs to seek appropriate relief by another suit if they
should, hereafter be required by the commission to comply
with conditions or provisions not warranted by law."
In Morris v. Duby, et al., Highway Commissioners," the
motor truck carrier sought to enjoin enforcement of an order
reducing the permitted load from 22,000 to 16,5oo pounds. The
road concerned was the Columbia River Highway, built by Oregon and the United States co-operating, and one of the carrier'9
arguments, denied by the court, is that the Oregon acceptance
of the Federal Act bound the state to the load limit in force at
the time of acceptance. The twenty-two- miles of road affected
by the order was intrastate, but as it was part of the interstate
go274

U. S. 135 (1927).
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highway into Washington, it was argued that it would interfere
with interstate commerce on the road. Said Taft, C. J.:
"An examination of the ,acts of Congress discloses no
provision, express or implied, by which there is withheld
from the state its ordinary police power to conserve the
highways in the interest of the public and to prescribe such
reasonable regulations for their use as may be wise to prevent injury and damage to them. In the absence of national
legislation especially covering the subject of interstate commerce, the state may rightly prescribe uniform regulations
adapted to promote safety upon its highways and the conservation of their use, applicable alike to vehicles moving
in interstate commerce and those of its own citizens. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 61o (1915); Kane v. New

Jersey, 242 U. S. 16o (1916). Of course the state may not
discriminate against interstate commerce, Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S.307 (1925). But there is no sufficient averment of such discrimination in the bill. In the Kuykendall
case this court said (page 315):

"'With the increase in number and size of the vehicles
used upon a highway, both the danger and the wear and
tear grow. To exclude unnecessary vehicles-particularly
the large ones commonly used by carriers for hire-promotes both safety and economy. State regulation of that
character is valid even as applied to interstate commerce,
in the absence of legislation by Congress which deals specifically with the subject.'
"The mere fact that a truck company may not make a
profit unless it can use a truck with load weighing 22,000
or more pounds does not show that a regulation forbidding
it is either discriminatory or unreasonable. That it prevents competition with freight traffic on parallel steam
railroads may possibly be a circumstance to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of such a limitation, though
that is doubtful, but it is necessarily outweighed when it
appears by decision of competent authority that such weight
is injurious to the highway for the use of the general public and unduly increases the cost of maintenance and repair.
In the absence of any averments of specific facts to show
fraud or abuse of discretion, we must accept the judgment
of the highway commission upon this question which is
committed to their decision as against merely general averments denying their official finding.
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"Under the convention between the United States and
the state in respect to these, jointly aided roads, the maintenance after construction is primarily imposed on the state.
Regulation as to the method of use therefore necessarily
remains with the state and cannot be interfered with unless the regulation is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to
defeat the useful purposes for which Congress has made
its large contribution to bettering the highway systems of
the Union and facilitating the carrying of the mails over
them."
In Interstate Busses Corporationv. Holyoke Street Railway
Company,51 the Supreme Court dealt with the matter of state
control of local intrastate traffic when undertaken by bus lines
engaged in hauls between interstate termini, and declined to allow
the latter traffic to "sweeten" the former when unauthorized by
the states involved. The Interstate Company sought to enjoin
the Holyoke Street Railway Company, various police officers
and prosecuting officers of towns and of the state, from enforcing the General Laws 52 barring the operation of motor vehicles
51273 U. S. 45 (927).
"The statutory provisions in question have been sustained by the highest court of Massachusetts. N. Y., N. H. & H. IL R. v.
Deister, 253 Mass. 178, 148 N. E. 59o (1925); Barrows v. Farnum's Stage
Lines, 254 Mass. 248, i5o N. E. 21o (1926); B. & M. R. R. v. Hart, 254 Mass.
253, 15o N. E. 212 (1926); Commonwealth v. Potter, 254 Mass. 271, 15o N. E.
213 (1926).
And these decisions were followed by the District Court in this
case." See note to Barrows case (1926) 39 HARv. L. Rlv. 9oo; (1926) 21 ILL.
L. REV. 166-7; and see note to Hazleton v. Interstate Stage Lines, 133 At. 451
(N. H. 1926), similar result under like statutes, noted (1927) I MINN. L.
REv. 157-62 and 165; also 47 A. L. R. 218 (1926).
' Sections 25, 48a and 49 of Chapter 159, General Laws, as amended by
c. 28o, Acts of 1925, contain the provisions attacked: "No person shall operate
a motor vehicle upon a public way in any city or town for the carriage of passengers for hire so as to afford a means of transportation similar to that afforded
by a railway company by indiscriminately receiving and discharging passengers
along the route on which the vehicle is operated, or as a business between fixed
and regular termini, without first obtaining a license. The licensing authority in
a city is its council, in a town is its selectmen; and, as to public ways under its
control, is the metropolitan district commission. No person shall operate a motor vehicle under such license unless he has also obtained from the department
of public utilities a certificate that public convenience and necessity require such
operation. Any one operating under a license from local authority and a certificate from the department is declared to be a common carrier and subject to regulation as such. Violations of sections 45-48, or of any order, rule, or regulation
made under them, are punishable by fine or imprisonment or both." And the act
gives to the Supreme Judicial and superior courts jurisdiction in equity to restrain any violation upon petition of the department, any licensing authority,
ten citizens of a city or town affected by the violation, or any interested party.
Neither license nor certificate is required in respect of such carriage as may be
exclusively interstate.
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without local city or town licenses and a certificate from the
State Public Utilities Department. Before the Interstate Company set up business through the same towns, the Holyoke Street
Railway Company for years did the local hauling. The bus line
ran from Greenfield, Mass., to Hartford, Conn., but its busses
carried both interstate and local intrastate passengers along the
same streets on which were laid the Holyoke Company's car
tracks, and the latter's consequent losses make it a vigorous prosecutor. The injunction was refused in the District Court made
up of the three judges. 53
In affirming the dismissal of the complaint, Butler, J., said
for the Court:
"Appellant's principal contention is that the Act contravenes the commerce clause. .

.

,

The Act existed in

some form before interstate transportation of passengers
,for hire by motor vehicle was undertaken. Its purpose is
to regulate local and intrastate affairs. No licenses from
local authorities or certificate of .public convenience and
necessity is required in respect of transportation that is exclusively interstate. Cf. Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307
(1925); Bush Co. v. Maloy, 267 U. S. 317 (1925).
The
burden is upon appellant to show that enforcement of the
Act operates to prejudice interstate carriage of passengers.
The stipulated facts do not so indicate. The threatened enforcement is to prevent appellant from carrying intrastate
passengers without license over that part of its route which
is parallel to the street railway. Its right to use the highways between Springfield and Hartford is not in controversy. While it appears that in Massachusetts both classes
of passengers are carried in the same vehicles, it is not
shown what part of the total number are intrastate or interstate. The record contains no information as to the
number of persons, if any, traveling in interstate commerce
on appellant's busses over the part of the route competing
with the street railway. It is not shown that the two classes
of business are so commingled that the separation of one
from the other is not reasonably practicable or that appellant's interstate passengers may not be carried efficiently and
economically in busses used exclusively for that purpose, or
Vi

F.(2d) 161 (D. C. Mass. 1926).
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that appellant's interstate business is dependent in any degree upon the local business in question. Appellant may
not evade the Act by the mere linking of its intrastate
transportation to its interstate or by the unnecessary transportation of both classes by means of the same instrumentalities and employees.
"There is no support for the contention that the enforcement of the Act deprives it of its property without due
process of law. Undoubtedly the state has power in the public interest reasonably to control and regulate the use of
its highways so long as it does not directly burden or interfere with interstate commerce. . .

The terms of the act

are not arbitrary or unreasonable. Appellant has not applied for and does not show that it is entitled to have a license from the local authorities or a certificate of public
necessity and convenience from the department. Plainly,
it has no standing to attack the validity of the statute as a
violation of the due process clause." 54
Thus the Supreme Court continues to prick out the lines
as to the latest transportation on the surface of the earth while
a new era of transportation above the surface comes over the
horizon; and in the meantime the Interstate Commerce Commission studies the motor bus situation with a view to recommending legislation to Congress. It has held a series of preliminary
hearings in various parts of the country in that behalf. At the
hearing held in Boston the New England Railways showed passenger losses to busses of one-fifth of the previous traffic. The
New Haven road estimated its annual passenger losses at $27,ooo,ooo and its freight losses at $io,ooo,ooo. On January I6th,
1928, the Commission's examiner filed a report, based on the
testimony taken at the various hearings throughout the country,
in which he makes the following suggestions:
The case is noted briefly in (1927) 26 MIcH. L. REv. 115; (1927) 75 U.
o PA. L. REv. 565. Also, the whole subject is summarized, in a note
Constitutional Obstacles to State Regulation of Bus Transportation, (1927)
40 HARv. L. Rav. 882-6, which discusses possible means of regulation but considers-questionably, perhaps-that the Interstate Commerce Commission's present authority over railroads would not suffice to protect them against bus competition even under Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago 13. & Q.
R. R., 257 U. S, 563 (1922) ; and that anyway the commission is overburdened
now. It commends the now pending bill in Congress committing the regulation
to the state boards (as did Messrs. Rosenbaum and Lilienthal in (1926) 26 COL.
L. REv. at p. 980).
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"Original jurisdiction in the administration of regulation over motor vehicles operating in interstate or foreign
commerce as common carriers over the public highways
should be vested in such State regulatory bodies as notify
the Interstate Commerce Commission that they will act.
"The Interstate Commerce Commission should be delegated to act with jurisdiction whenever a State board fails
to notify the Commission of its acceptance of the delega.tion of authority to act under the Federal statute, and until
such notice is received.
"Joint board composed of two or more State boards,
or representatives of such State boards and of the Interstate Commerce Commission when acting for a State board,
should be authorized to act where the commerce is carried
on in two or more States." 54a
Oral argument before the Commission on the report was set
down for February ioth.
In courts other than the Federal Supreme Court there are
some recent decisions of interest. In Sprout v. City of South
Bend,5 the bus man ran between South Bend, Indiana, and Niles,
Michigan, a distance of only about ten miles, and through country considerably built up along the route. Sprout sold tickets
only to some point in Michigan; but he took on in South Bend
many South Bend suburbanites whom he actually let off at points
on the road in Indiana before reaching the Michigan line, which
was about half-way. The Indiana Court held him to be subject to a South Bend ordinance requiring the license of those
"indiscriminately accepting persons for transportation from a
point inside the city limits of South Bend to a point outside"
and to its requirement of the filing of a bond conditioned to pay
passenger injury judgments. To his argument that the ordinance
burdened interstate commerce, it replied:
. See, however, an article by J. E. Cummings in (Q927) 35 JOUR. POL
EcoN-. 852, which argues "The need for coordination of our transportation
system" on the general thesis that the Interstate Commerce Commission should
have control of all rail, water, and bus carriage.
I98 Ind. 563, 153 N. E. 504 (1926) ; 49 A. L. R. iI98 (1926) and there
noted as "State Regulation of motor carriers as affected by the Interstate
Commerce clause." Argument on this case, in error was heard by the Supreme Court of the United States on January 20, 1928.
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"But, even if he did receive passengers only for transportation across the state line, the use of the city streets
as a place for the indiscriminate solicitation and acceptance
of passengers in a jitney bus brought him within the police
power of the state to license and regulate both driver and
vehicle by way of providing for the safety, security, and
general welfare of the public, so long, at least, as Congress
has not legislated on the subject. .

.

. And the facts that

he did not have any stations or soliciting agents and did
not confine his use of the streets of the city to driving on
and along them in carrying interstate commerce, but went
upon them with his motor vehicle, and there offered the
vehicle and his services generally for the use of patrons who
would take passage and pay fare to a point in Michigan
using the street both for the solicitation and receipt of passengers, brought his car within the description of a 'motor
driven commercial vehicle' and a 'motor driven commercial vehicle used within the limits (of the city) for public
hire,' that may be charged license fees and subjected to
regulations by the city, notwithstanding the certificate of
registration issued by the secretary of state."
In New York Central R. R. v. Conlin Bus Lines, Inc.,5"
the railroad successfully petitioned that the paralleling bus line
be adjudged in contempt for violation of an injunction against
operating in certain towns without their consent. Despite the
fact that the bus line ran into a Connecticut terminal the court
said:
"The plaintiff is entitled to prevail. The findings all
appear to have been justified and the order as to final decree was right. They were in conformity to the law and
the statutes.

. .

.

The governing principles of law have

been amplified in recent decisions and need not be restated.
These adjudications demonstrate that there is no unwarrantable interference with interstate commerce in the controlling statutes and in the decree ordered."
After the Supreme Court's decision in Interstate Bus Corporation v. Holyoke St. Ry. Co.,57 we may expect that the type

of case like the above will come to an end as to bus lines which
so155
T

N. E. 6oi (Mass. 1927).
" Supra note 51.
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heretofore have persisted in the endeavor to make a little interstate leaven lighten a large lump of intrastate traffic.57a How
much or how little those same towns have been disarmed by the
Buck 51 and Maloy '59 cases, of power to lessen the noise and
noisomeness of the large volume of interstate trucks and busses
which go roaring through them, is not so clear. In those cases
the state action bottomed on criteria which the court said it was
not the function of the state to apply. 0 "Police power," "nuisance," etc., as criteria before litigation, are words of no content until content has been put into them in any particular case,
but Philadelphia has precipitated inquiry as to how far self-protective devices measured by a city's judgment of its dangers from
interstate busses may be carried. In American Transit Co. v.
City of Philadelphia)1 the plaintiffs operated from Philadelphia
to various cities (New York, Atlantic City, N. J., and Wilmington, Del.) in other states, carrying, the court says, "passengers
in interstate commerce only but the drivers were permitted to
accept passengers at intermediate points." 62 On receiving notice
" The leaveners sustained a decided dampening of hopes in Intercity Coach
Co. v. Attwood, et al., 21 F. (2d) 83 (927), noted (1927) 41 HARv. L. REv.
260, and (1927) 26 MICH. L. REv. 221. A Rhode Island District Court of three
judges refused to enjoin the action of the state commission which had considered the interstate commerce involved as "negligible.'"
The haul was from Voonsocket, R. I., to Providence, R. I., but "the route
will cross the Massachusetts line into Attleboro, Mass., and proceed thence to
Woonsocket." The Attleboro section "is not thickly settled." The "busses
bore no Attleboro marking: they carried signs, reading 'Providence-Woonsocket' and they ran through from city to city-which strongly supports the
view of the Rhode Island Commission that the journey into Massachusetts was
a subterfuge to escape state regulation." The Federal court concurred in this
view.
The Harvard note writer shows some qualms about the case if its theory
is that the Transit is not interstate, and prefers to regard the haul as interstate commerce which in the absence of Congressional action is left to local
regulation.
' Supra note 45.
"Supra note 46.

' Buck v. Kuykendall, mspra note 45: "Moreover it determines whether the
prohibition shall be applied by resort, through state officials, to a test which it
is peculiarly within the province of the .federal action-the existence of adequate facilities for conducting interstate commerce."
18 F. (2) 991 (E. D. Pa. 1927).
Presumably this means that drivers picked up passengers on the streets of
Philadelphia outside the terminal in that city. The opinion does not indicate one
way or another, but it does seem clear in the context that the busses did no
"cruising" on the streets though they apparently did not follow a fixed route
through them.
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that bus drivers operating on the streets without having complied with a recent ordinance and without a license, etc., would
be arrested, the bus line asked the Federal Court to 'enjoin the
execution of the provisions of the ordinance.6 3 The familiar
undue burden on interstate commerce argument was rejected and
the suit dismissed. Judge Thompson handled the case realistically, saying:
"The question then is whether the exercise of the police
power through the ordinances in question is such as to bring
the case within the forbidden restrictions against interfering or burdening such commerce and thereby rendering the
regulation invalid regardless of the fact that it was intended
as a police regulation. In order to determine that question,
it is necessary to take into consideration the ever-changing
condition in the development of the traffic at which it is
directed, common to our great cities, which has arisen, due
to the extensive present use of motor vehicles. Are these
ordinances necessary as police regulations, for the enforcement of good order and the protection of the safety of citizens of Philadelphia and the public generally?
"In order to appreciate the necessities of the situation
which induced city councils to pass the ordinances under
attack and the Legislature to extend the power to cities, we
must consider what we see about us. The population of
the city of Philadelphia has increased to approximately
2,000,000. It has hundreds of miles of streets, many of
which are narrower than those in municipalities more recently laid out, barely wide enough to accommodate the
traffic of 25 years ago, when the motor vehicle was unknown, but now daily congested through the endless procession of automobiles, motor trucks, and motor busses,
which also, in the exigencies of business and pleasure,
occupy much of the roadways while stopping to load and
unload, or while left parked along the sidewalks.
"Added to the heretofore constantly increasing number of passenger automobiles and motor trucks carrying
merchandise, has now come the motor bus for the carriage
It read that no bus running on the city streets should run without license; the application for the license had to state the driver's qualifications, the
proposed routes within the city; fees were provided for. The driver had to be
licensed also and was required to state residence, age, height, etc., experience,
criminal record, if any, and furnish a photograph to be attached to his license:
also references to two reputable citizens.

REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES

of passengers within the city limits and beyond. These
motor busses are built with the design to contain as many
passengers as can be profitably carried. They occupy a large
part of the space upon the streets through which they travel,.
and their weight and size is such that, unless driven with due
care by skillful operators, they become a menace to pedestrians at the street crossings and to other vehicles and their
occupants in the use of the roadways.
"Is there anything unreasonable in requiring those operating vehicles of this class to do what the city ordinance
prescribes?"
In -the Philadelphiacase the court sustained also the provisions of the ordinance imposing the license fee of $5o for each
bus, which amount the court felt only approximated the costs
of administering the ordinance. The average monthly income
there (from 1:2 busses) was $18,ooo to $2o,ooo.64
In Interstate Busses Corporationv. Blodgett, Tax Commissioner of Connecticut,65 the Connecticut District Court of three

judges dealt with the effort of the state to make the busses contribute directly to the maintenance of the right of way by a
law 66 made specifically applicable to bus lines operating between
Connecticut cities and those in other states. 67 In the form of a
Another ordinance requiring a $5000, per bus, bond conditioned on the payment of personal and property injury claim was not pressed and the court
thought "Its validity as an exercise of the police power is doubtful." He did
not refer to Packard v. Benton, 264 U. S. 140 (1924).
65ig F. (2d) 256 (D. C. Conn. 1927).
'Chapter 254 of the Public Acts of 1925, Part 2, § 4, provided that the

owner of a motor vehicle which is operated over any highway in the state for the
purpose of carrying passengers from a point outside the state to a point within
the state (or vice versa) shall annually file a statement of miles over the roads
each vehicle ran and pay to the treasurer as an excise on the use of the highway
one cent for each mile so used.
' Busses in intrastate business were subjected, separately, to a detailed supervision by the Utilities Commission of rules, routes, fares, speeds, schedules, continuity of service and convenience and safety of the public.
The court points out that there was "in no sense a discrimination against
interstate commerce," but its recital of the obligations on the intrastate carrier
does not include a similar "excise"; and it apparently balanced the many impositions upon the intrastate traffic against this single one. "The interstate carrier is
subject only to pay the mileage tax. He selects his own routes and roads at will.
He may travel them as often as he wishes as the calls of his business may require. He fixes his rates of traffic and contributes nothing to the upkeep of the
roads or the buildings of new ones. He carries no insurance by regulation of
law (for injury to person or property) and he is not required to report to the
public officials in any manner except by the command of the present enactment."
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mileage tax of one cent per mile for the use of its highways
the state took so much glitter out of the gold that the bus lines
naturally sought the reaction of the local Federal judiciary to the
familiar argument.
Writing for the court, Manton, Cir. J., relied upon Hendrick v. Maryland,68 which had pointed out the wear and tear on
roads and the state's right to compensation, and said: "The
amount of the charges and the method of collection was held to
be primarily for the determination by the state, and so long as
they are reasonable, and are fixed according to some uniform
fair, and practical standard, they constitute no burden on interstate commerce." Reciting similar words from Kane v. New
Jersey,6 9 he concluded that "The theory of the tax imposed by
statute here is consistent with the rulings of these cases." 70
The Supreme Court heard argument in error in the case on
January 20 last, just before it recessed till February 20. Its
prior language as quoted in Clark v. Poor,7oa is no comfort to

the bus lines. Presumably, therefore, Connecticut has shown
to many money-seeking states a new source of revenue. Since
a railroad which competes with the bus lines not only buys and
maintains its right of way but pays taxes on it as well, the public
treasury's demand that the motor vehicle carriers bear a charge
something similar seems fair enough. Certainly it is imperative
that before thinking of allowing the railroad investment to go
the way the canal investment went a hundred years ago, current
society before discarding the old should experiment with the new
upon as equal a cost basis as can be arranged. If the talked-of
trunk line toll roads for heavy motor traffic come to actuality
we may have some definite financial illumination whereby to make
the comparison.
In the field which is primarily federal the state authority continues to lessen. Several cases dealing with state-pree"235

U. S. 61o (1915).

"242

U. S. 16o (igi6).

70See Professor Elder's note Interstate Commerce-Motor Bus and Motor
Truck Transportation Companies-Control by State Authorities, in (1926) 21
I. L. Ra,. 166 for a short review of the cases on the topic.
"a Ante p. 549.
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scribed rolling stock equipment were decided adversely to the
state's jurisdiction in Napier, Attorney General, v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. R. and Chicago Northwestern R. R. v. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin and Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. v.
Railroad Comissio*n of Wisconsin.71 As Mr. Justice Brandeis,
writing for the court, stated it, all three presented the question
"Whether the Boiler Inspection Act

72

has occupied the field of

regulating locomotive equipment used on a highway of interstate commerce so as to preclude state legislation."
The Napier case involved a Georgia statute requiring an
automatic firebox door; the two cases against the Wisconsin
Commission involved the latter's order concerning cab curtains.7 3
Said Brandeis, J., for the court:
"Each device was prescribed by the state primarily to
promote the health and comfort of engineers and firemen.
Each state requirement may be assumed to be a proper exercise of its police power, unless the measure violates the
commerce clause. It may be assumed, also, that there is no
physical conflict between the devices required by the state
and those specifically prescribed by Congress or the Interstate Commerce Commission, and that the interference with
commerce resulting from the state legislation would be incidental only. The intention of Congress to exclude states
from exerting their police power must be clearly manifested.
Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 148 (19o2); Savage v.

Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 533 (1912). Does the legislation of
Congress manifest the intention to occupy the entire field of
regulating locomotive equipment? Obviously it did not do
so by the Safety Appliance Act, since its requirements are
specific. It did not do so by the original Boiler Inspection
Act, since its provisions were limited to the boiler. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co. v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280 (1914). But
the power delegated to the Commission by the Boiler Inspection Act as amended is a general one. It extends to the
design, the construction, and the material of every part of
the locomotive and tender and of all appurtenances.
2e72 U. S. 6o5 (1927).
STAT. 913.

7236
'

See note on case in Wisconsin Supreme Court, 188 Wis.
(1926) 39 HARv.L. REV. 395.

932 (1925),

232, 205

N. W.
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"The requirements here in question are, in their nature,
within the scope of the authority delegated to the Commission. The question whether the Boiler Inspection Act confers upon the Interstate Commerce Commission power to
specify the sort of equipment to be used on locomotives was
left open in Vandalia R. Co. v. Public Service Commission,
242 U. S. 255 (1916).
We think that power was conferred.
The duty of the Commission is not merely to inspect. It is
also to prescribe the rules and regulations by which fitness
for service shall be determined. Unless these rules and regulations are complied with, the engine is not 'in proper condition' for operation. Thus the Commission sets the standard. By setting the standard it imposes requirements. The
power to require specific devices was exercised before the
amendment of 1915, and has been extensively exercised
since.
"The federal and the state statutes are directed to the
same subject-the equipment of locomotives. They operate upon the same object. It is suggested that the power
delegated to the Commission has been exerted only in respect to minor changes or additions. But this, if true, is not
of legal significance. It is also urged that, even if the Commission has power to prescribe an automatic firebox door
and a cab curtain, it has not done so, and that it has made
no other requirement inconsistent with the state legislation.
This also, if true, is without legal significance. The fact
that the Commission has not seen fit to exercise its authority
to the full extent conferred has no bearing upon the construction of the act delegating the power. We hold that
state legislation is precluded, because the Boiler Inspection
Act, as we construe it, was intended to occupy the field. The
broad scope of the authority conferred upon the Commission leads to that conclusion. Because the standard set by
the Commission must prevail, requirements by the states
are precluded, however commendable or however different
their purpose. Compare Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v.
State, 16 Ala. App. 199, 76 So. 505 (1917); Whish v. Public Service Commission, 200 N. Y. Supp. 282 (1923), 240
N. Y. 677, 148 N. E. 755 (1925) ; Staten Island Rapid Transit Co. v. Public Service Commission, 16 F.(2d) 313 (S. D.
N. Y. 1926).

"If the protection now afforded by the Commission's
rules is deemed inadequate, application for relief must be
made to it. The Commission's power is ample. Obviously,
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the rules to be prescribed for this purpose need not be uniform throughout the United States, or at all seasons, or for
all classes of service."
Thus the authority of the state is read out of existence in
favor, not of any direct or potentially direct action of Congress
itself, but in favor of action, under delegation from Congress, of
and administrative body merely, and in the actual case of only its
potential action since no rule had yet been made by the Commission. To the writer the case appears therefore a particularly
significant example of the court's urge toward realizing its concept of the unity of control of the railroads, as a whole, under
the Interstate Commerce Commission. It had, however, swept
away actual state legislation for uncovered spots in the interacting areas, which it admits need covering, in favor of the mere
potentiality of federally imposed rules in other cases. 7 4

Since,

Porter75

it did so by making
in Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v.
general language in Congressional acts govern specific contrary
provisions in the same statutes, the present decisions on the interpretation of general language standing alone are to be expected
from the background of the court's working theory. 76
"The Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307 (1925), and Bush v. Maloy, 267
U. S. 317 (1925) cases are examples.
See the case ante, p. 412.
.0

In State ex rel. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio v. New York Cen-

tral Railroad Co., 115 Ohio St. 477, 154 N. E. 790 (1926), the commission had

made an order that pusher engines "be coupled to the last car and made a part
of the train, and that all connections controlling the air or power brake system
be properly made with such pusher engine," applicable to all railroads operating
in Ohio. The Ohio court refused to grant mandamus to compel the Central to
obey, partly on the ground that its reading of the local statute did not confer
the particular authority on the commission but also: "To give effect to gerferal
order No. 16 of the Public Utilities Commission would immediately require all
trains in interstate traffic to be fully equipped with power brakes with necessary
couplings and attachments. We are therefore brought face to face with the
recent case of Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 272 U. S. 6o5 (1926).
It has been argued by counsel for the relator that that case does not control,
because it refers only to appliances and not to the manner of operating trains.
It has already been seen, however, that appliances become necessary, and inasmuch as the Interstate Commerce Commission has authority in these matters,
though it has not seen fit to exercise such authority to the full extent of the
power conferred, the field is regarded as fully occupied and the jurisdiction of
the state commission is excluded. Upon the authority of the Napier Case, supra,
as well as upon the lack of jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission of
Ohio, the peremptory writ of mandamus must be denied."
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In the technique of litigation, as in that of war, the selection
of the site for battle is a part of the fight. Only as to legal warfare concerning land 77 is the ground automatically selected by
the nature of the litigation itself. Frequently it is set by the accident of the plaintiff's finding his adversary here or there for service; and if "here" is the plaintiff's home ground where his forces
are best marshalled, while "there" is the enemy's, we may expect
to find efforts to make the enemy fight away from home. It is
understandable human nature that the plaintiff's home state
In Staten Island R. Transit Co. v. Public Service Commission of New

York, i6 F.(2d) 313 (S. D. N. Y., 1926), a court of three judges enjoined the

enforcement of state statutes which required the electrification of railroad lines
operating in cities of over i,ooo,ooo population by January, 1926. Details were
left to be prescribed by the commission. Among other objections the direct
burden was advanced but Hand, Cir. J., said that "Finally we shall assume
that the section imposes no direct burden . . .; that is, that until Congress regulated the subject matter the state was free to direct the change.
The significance of 'direct' interference . . . as opposed to 'indirece we
shall not try to define. Nevertheless, with all these things conceded the question
still remains whether the section conflicts with any lawful action of Congress
already taken, and is unconstitutional in that sense.
"Nor is it essential to that result that the conflict should be literal and
express, in the sense in which a subsequent statute may repeal an earlier by
implication. It is only necessary that Congress shall discover a purpose to
occupy the field, as the phrase goes, and to exclude any further action by the
states. When that appears, if the subject be interstate commerce, it will invalidate existing as well as future laws. Charleston & W. C. R. R. v. Varnville
Furniture Co., 237 U. S. 597 (915); New York Central R. R. v. Winfield,
244 U. S. 147 (1917); Penn. R. R. v. Public Service Commission, 250 U. S.
566 (i919). The doctrine is sometimes hard to apply, but the proposition is
indubitable.
"The original Boiler Inspection Act of 1911 (Comp. St., § 863o et seq.),
as its name implies, did not cover all parts of the locomotive, and was necessarily limited to steam. In 1915 (Comp. St., § 863oa et seq.) it was, however,
extended to cover the locomotive, its tender and their appurtenances, and thus
brought into being a system of federal inspection, with an attendant organization which covered all parts of steam locomotives used by interstate railroads.
The scheme went further, however, than merely to provide for inspection,
because the act not only required that, but that the boiler should be 'in proper
condition and safe to operate in the service to which the same is put,' and that
it should 'be able to withstand such test or tests as may be prescribed in the
rules or regulations,' which the Interstate Commerce Commission should from
time to time promulgate. After 1915 this gave to the Interstate Commerce
Commission power to prescribe the design, construction, and material of the
whole locomotive, and with the Safety Appliance Act (Comp. St., § 86o5 et seq.)
put the supervision of all the steam rolling stock of interstate railroads into
the hands of the Commission. On June 7, 1924 (Comp. St., § 863o et seq.),
more than a year after section 53a of the Public Service Commission Law of
New York was passed, this act, as amended, was extended to all locomotives,
electric as well as steam, and the system became complete. It is with this statute
in view that we must determine the validity of the local law."
The limitations of the general statement are set out by A. W. Scott in
his "Fundamentals of Procedure," Chap. 2.
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should try to stage the fight for him;.and indeed some states consider that he must be a resident in order to start the legal war
within its borders; 78 others do not.
This jockeying for position has become involved with the
direct burden on interstate commerce doctrine in recent cases of
which Iron City Produce Co. v. American Railway Express Co. 7 9

is an example. In the particular case the plaintiff was not from
Ohio nor did the cause of action arise in that state since it involved damages to berries received in New York for transport to
the plaintiffs in Pennsylvania. Service was made, however, upon
the Cincinnati, Ohio, representatives of the express company in
reliance upon the bald language of the Ohio General Code, Section i129o: "When the defendant is a foreign corporation having a managing agent in this state, the service may be upon such
agent." The court recited the decision in Davis, Agent, v. Farmers' Co-operative Equity Company,"0 where the Minnesota statute allowing suit by service upon an agent of an out-of-the-state
railroad who was within the state soliciting traffic was held invalid as an unreasonable burden, and in reliance upon it decided
that the service in the case before it was properly quashed. The
decision seems desirable, and is covered by the reasoning of the
Davis case as to the burdens laid on the carrier in marshalling
forces on fields not connected with the circumstances, in any
'See a, note in (1923) 8 MINN. L. Rav. 47 to Loftus v. P. R. R. C., 1O7
Ohio St. 352, 14o N. E. 94 (1923). The case sustained a statute which localized
actions.

A recent note, ConstitiotioWl Right of Non-resident to Sue, (1928)

41

IAgv. L. REV. 387, discusses the Loftus and like decisions as presumably violative of the privileges and immunities clause of the Federal Constitution if
applied to citizens of other states in the Union.
*'220 Ohio App. 165, 153 N. E. 316 (1926).
8' Mr. Justice Brandeis went into the question with his usual insight, and
said: "That the claims against interstate carriers for personal injuries and for
loss and damage of freight are numerous; that the amounts demanded are large;
that in many cases carriers deem it imperative, or advisable, to leave the determination of their liability to, the courts; that litigation in states or jurisdictions
remote from that in which the cause of action arose entails absence of employees
from their customary occupations and that this impairs efficiency in operation,
and causes directly and indirectly, heavy expense to the carriers; these are
matters of common knowledge. Facts of which we also take judicial notice
indicate that the burden upon interstate carriers imposed specifically by the statute here assailed is a heavy one, and that the resulting obstruction to commerce
must be serious." 262 U. -S. 312 (1923).
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reasonable way, 8 ' but in the Davis case the Atchison, Topeka and
Santa Fe, the road in question, did no business in the state except the solicitation, while we may presumably take "judicial
notice" that the American Railway Express Company does a
general business in the state of Ohio.
In a case potentially S of concern to interstate motor vehicle
transportation generally, argument concerning the burden on interstate commerce was not raised. Hess v. Pawloski,s 3 which
will probably greatly tend to localize litigation at the point of
injury, of sympathy and of witnesses, upheld the Massachusetts
statute of 1923 allowing personal judgment to be taken in Massachusetts courts on the theory that "the operation by a non-resident
of a motor vehicle on a public way in the Commonwealth
shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such non-resident of the (state) registrar .
.
to be his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful processes in
any action .
.
.
growing out of any accident or collision
while (so) operating

.

.

and said

.

.

.

operation

shall be a signification of his agreement (that the service be as if
personal on him)," Stat. 1923 Ch. 431, section 2.
' Brandeis, J., was careful to say: "It may be that a statute like that here,
assailed would be valid although applied to suits in which the cause of action
arose elsewhere, if the transaction out of which it arose had been entered upon
within the state, or if the plaintiff was, when it arose, a resident of the state.
These questions are not before us, and we express no opinion upon them. But
orderly, effective administration of justice dearly does not require that a foreign carrier shall submit to a suit in a state in which the cause of action did
not arise, in which the transaction giving rise to it was not entered upon, in
which the carrier neither owns nor operates a railroad, in which the plaintiff
does not reside. . . . With these ends the Minnesota statute, as here
applied, unduly interferes. By requiring from interstate carriers general submission to suit, it unreasonably obstructs, and unduly burdens, interstate commerce."
' The Wisconsin courts had already upheld a statute like that of Massachusetts. See State v. Belden, 211 N. W. 916 (1927), noted (1927) 4 Wis. L. REv.

189.

.274 U. S. 352 (1927). The case, while in the Massachusetts courts, was
discussed in the law reviews: (1925) 5 BOSTON UNIV. L. Rlv. 46; (1925) 25 COL.
L. REV. 208; (1924) 38 HARv. L. REv. I1; (1925) 9 MINN. L. REV. 362;
(1925) 73 U. OF PA. L. REv. 171; (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 425; and was the subject of articles by A. W. Scott, Jurisdiction Over Motorists, (1926) 39 HARV.
L. REv. 563, and E. W. Hinton, Substituted Service on Nonresidents, (1925)
2o ILL. L. REv. i.
On the Supreme Court's decision see "The Case of Hess v. Pawloski,"
by H. T. Meleski-the attorney for the original plaintiff-in (1927)
7 BOSTON UNIV. L. REv. 243; also notes, (1927) 41 HARV.L. REv. 94; (1927)
26 MIcH. L. REV. 212.
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Beside the cases already adverted to, p. 4O ante, on the
discontinuance of intrastate service or intrastate branch lines
wherein the blending of the interstate and intrastate has substantially and effectively operated to throw the whole into the hands
of the federal authority and those decisions dealing with the
financial unity of the interstate-intrastate carrier, the precise doctrine of the Shreveport Rate Case,8 4 strengthened by the policy of
the 192o Act, appears in some recent decisions. The doctrine was
broadly accepted in State e. rel. Railroad and Warehouse Con-

inissionv. NorthernPacific Railway, 5 where the state court itself
sided against the state commission. The Commerce Commission
having found that intrastate rates in Minnesota were so low as to
discriminate against Fargo, North Dakota, in interstate commerce, increased intrastate rates in Minnesota within 150 miles of
the North Dakota city. Yet the Minnesota Commission's suit to
enjoin the local carriers from using the rates set by Interstate
Commerce Commission was dismissed.
It was argued that compliance meant a violation of the state
Long and Short Haul Act since the state rates outside of the 150-

mile radius were left as before and "that no order of the Interstate Commerce Commission can relieve a common carrier from
its obligation to observe the laws of the state prohibiting preferences in the rates accorded to individuals or localities for intrastate transportation." The court simply replied: "The rates established affected intrastate as well as interstate traffic and the
discrimination and inequalities of which the (state) commission
complains are due to the acts of the carriers which the Interstate
Commerce Commission has authorized. We see no escape from
the conclusion that the courts of this 80 state cannot compel the
Houston E. W. Texas Railway Company v. U. S., supra note 3. It held
that when the Interstate Commerce Commission found a discrimination against
interstate traffic arising from the relation of intrastate to interstate rates and
upheld the latter as reasonable, the carriers were free to raise the intrastate
rates to the level of the interstate, despite the state's objection. It arose out
of the inability of Shreveport, Louisiana, in competition with Texas cities to
secure the trade of nearby Texans.
168 Minn. 393, 21o N. W. 399 (1926).
'A note to the case in (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 714 asks how great the interest of the locality discriminated against must be in proportion to the intrastate
commerce affected.
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respondent to cease (such) rates, although as a consequence the
whole structure of intrastate class rates is disturbed and glaring
inequalities are created. Respondent cannot obey the state law
without incurring the penalties of the Federal law and the state
cannot compel obedience to its law and consequent disregard of
Federal authority. "Manifestly one authority must be paramount, and when it speaks the other must be silent."
The decision seems to place a large stopper on a policy of
keeping business at home.
The Federal Supreme Court itself, on the other hand, required more explicitness for the ousting of the state authority in
Arkansas Railroad Commission v. Chicago, Rock Island and
Pacific Railroad Company. 7 There the railroad filed an intrastate tariff increasing rates to conform to interstate tariffs which
the Interstate Commerce Commission had prescribed. This new
intrastate tariff the Arkansas Commission suspended and the
federal suit arose on the carrier's attempt to enjoin enforcement
of the suspension order. After success in the District Court of
three judges, it failed before the Supreme Court.
The controversy had its origin in a general inquiry arising
out of alleged discrimination against Memphis, Tenn., in respect
to various intrastate rates. In the former, which concerned Arkansas, southern Missouri, and Louisiana areas, there was an
express finding that the Arkansas intrastate rate worked a discrimination and there issued an express order for its removal.
But in the latter, though the territory involved was in part the
same, it covered a much larger field, as Brandeis, J., explained:
"The Texas and Oklahoma intrastate rates were found
prejudicial to interstate commerce to the extent to which
they were lower than the interstate rates, for like distances,
in force in those states. But the Interstate Commerce Commission made no finding or order with reference to the
Arkansas intrastate rates.
"The intention to interfere with the state function of
regulating intrastate rates is not to be presumed. Where
there is a serious doubt whether an order of the Interstate
ST47

Sup. Ct. 724 (1927).
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Commerce Commission extends to intrastate rates, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the state power. If, as the
railroad believed, the federal commission intended to include the intrastate Arkansas rates within its order, it should
have taken action, through appropriate application, to remove the doubt by securing an expression by that commission of the intention so to do.
Laurence, et al., Corporation Commissioners of Oklatwma
v. St. Louis Railway Co.,"" dealt with the provisions of the Oklahoma Statutes " against the removal of railroad shops without
the consent of the state commission. The to-be-abandoned town,
Salupa, appealed to the State Commission, and the railroad filed
suit in the local Federal Court asking that the State Commission
be "enjoined from compelling the railroad to submit to (its)
jurisdiction in the matter." The District Court of three judges
duly enjoined, but delivered no opinion. Their decree was reversed. Says Mr. justice Brandeis:
"The decree disregards the requirement of section 19
of the Act of October 15, 1914, c. 323, 38 Stat. 730, 738
(United States Code of laws, Title 28, §383, p. 909; Comp.
St. §1243c). 'That every order of injunction . . . shall
set forth the reasons for the issuance of the same, shall be
specific in terms. .

.

. ' It does not declare that the Okla-

homa statute is unconstitutional, nor does it state any other
reason why the action enjoined is a violation of plaintiff's
rights. It does not recite, even in general terms, that there
is danger of irreparable loss. It sets forth no fact from
which such danger can be inferred. It recites merely that
the case was submitted on affidavits and that . .
temporary injunction prayed for . . . should be

.

'the

granted.'
"Although proper practice demands that the provision
thus prescribed by Congress be scrupulously observed, disregard of the statutory requirement concerning the form of
the order did not render the interlocutory decree void. Druggan v. Anderson,, 269 U. S. 36, 4o (1925).

It must, how-

ever, be reversed, because the verified bill and the affidavits
fail to supply that evidence of danger of irreparable injury
' 47 Sup. Ct. 720 (1927).
Okla. Rev. Laws (92),

§§ 3482-85.
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to plaintiff which is essential to justify issuance of a temporary injunction.
"We have no occasion to determine whether the Oklahoma act is obnoxious to the Federal Constitution. But
as bearing upon the propriety of issuing the temporary injunction the fact is important that the controversy concerns the respective powers of the nation and of the states
over railroads engaged in interstate commerce. Such railroads are subject to regulation by both the state and the
United States. The delimitation of the respective powers of
the two governments requires often nice adjustments. The
federal power is paramount. But public interest demands
that, whenever possible, conflict between the two authorities and irritation be avoided. To this end it is important
that the federal power be not exerted unnecessarily, hastily,
or harshly. It is important, also, that the demands of
comity and courtesy, as well as of the law, be deferred to.
It was said in Western & Atlantic R. R. v. Georgia Public
Service Conmission, 267 U. S. 493, 496 (1925), that a law
of a state may be valid which prohibits an important change
in local transportation conditions without application to the
state commission, although the ultimate authority to determine whether the change could or should be made may
rest with the federal commission. And it was there said
that the 'action of the company in discontinuing the service
without a petition' to the state body was 'arbitrary and defiant.' Compare Henderson Water Co. v. Corporation
Commission, 269 U. S. 278 (1925). To require that the
regulating body of the state be advised of a proposed change
seriously affecting transportation conditions is not such an
obvious interference with interstate commerce that, on application for a preliminary injunction, the act should lightly
be assumed to be beyond the power of the state.
"The purpose of Congress . . . was . . . in part to

insure deliberation and thus minimize the chances of error.
It was in part to allay the irritation naturally incident to
the interference by injunction with the action of the state
government . . . The importance of an opinion to litigants and to this court in cases of this character was pointed
out in Virginian Ry. v. U. S., 272 U. S. 658 (1926). The
importance is even greater where the decree enjoins the
enforcement of a state law or the action of state officials
thereunder. For then the respect due to the state demands
that the need for nullifying . . . be persuasively shown."
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In the matter of modification of the existing fabric of railways the Act of 1920 gives the Commerce Commission a zealous
guardianship both as to its financial aspects and as to those
which are of its physical appurtenances. Its control of the dropping of traffic or of rail lines has been consideredY0 Its hand in
the construction of new lines is no less firm and there are frequent recent cases.
In Alabama and Vicksburg Railway Company v. Jackson
and Eastern Railway Company," the Jackson and Eastern, a
Mississippi corporation engaged in Mississippi in commerce both
interstate and intrastate, began eminent domain proceedings in
the Mississippi courts, 92 in order to secure a connection with the

other road similarly organized and engaged. A protesting road,
the Alabama and Vicksburg, urged that the state jurisdiction
did not cover the case and that the Interstate Commerce Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over the establishment of
junctions between roads engaged in interstate commerce. The
Mississippi Court replied 93 that Congress had not taken full
control and that the state law did not interfere with interstate
commerce to any appreciable degree. It refused to enjoin the
proceedings. Reversing this, Mr. Justice Brandeis for the Court,
sketched the history of the physical connection and of the swing
into the hands of the Commerce Commission of its control, saying:
"In Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S.
287 (19oo), this court sustained an order of a state com-

mission which, at the instance of shippers, had directed two
railroads of the state engaged in interstate and intrastate
commerce to provide a physical connection between their
lines. The state commission had found that the connection
Alde, P. 401.
27i U. S. 244 (1926).

The case is noted in (1927) ii MiTN. L. REv. 164.
Jackson and Eastern Road had secured a certificate of utility, the
Interstate Commerce Commission authorizing the extension of its line from
Sebastopol, Miss., into Jackson in that state. It had also asked for an order on
the Alabama and Vicksburg for a connection at Curran, and the joint use of its
main line into Jackson, but withdrew the request and started the proceedings in
the state court.
2The

3 36 Miss. 726, ioi So. 553 (924).
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was required for intrastate commerce; and this court concluded that the connection ordered could not prejudice interstate commerce. Since then the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission has been greatly enlarged and
the power of the states over interstate carriers correspondingly restricted. Prominent among the enlarged powers of
the Federal Commission is the control conferred over construction and equipment of railroads, over their use by
other carriers and, generally, over the relation of carriers
to one another. While none of the amendments in specific
terms confer upon the Commission exclusive power over
physical connections between railroads engaged in interstate commerce, it is clear that the comprehensive powers
conferred extend to junctions between main lines like those
here in
question. . . . It was not until Transportation
Act, 4 1920, chap. 91, 41 Stat. at L. 456, Comp. Stat.

§IO74, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1920, p. 72 conferred
upon the Commission additional authority, that it acquired
full power over connections between interstate carriers. By
11I 8-2o added to §i, it vested in the Commission power
to authorize constructions or extensions of lines, although
the railroad is located wholly within one state; and by ff 21
authorized the Commission to require the carrier 'to extend
its line or lines.' By ff 4 of § it empowered the Commission
to require one such carrier to permit another to use its terminal facilities 'including main-line track or tracks for a reasonable distance outside of such terminal.'
"The only limitation set by TransportationAct, 1920,
upon the broad powers conferred upon the Commission
94 He recites
also: "The Act to Regulate Commerce, February 4, 1887,
chap. lO4, 24 Stat. at L. 379, Comp. Stat., § 8565, 4 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p.
379, provided by what is now paragraph 3 of § 3, that carriers shall "afford all
reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between
their respective lines"; but it did not confer upon the Commission authority to
permit and to require the construction of the physical connection needed to
effectuate such interchange. Paragraph 9 of § i, introduced by Act of June
18, 19io, chap. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. at L. 539, 544, Comp. Stat., § 8563 4 Fed.
Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 337, required a carrier engaged in interstate commerce to
construct a switch connection "upon application of any lateral, branch line" and
empowered the Commission to enforce the duty; but that provision was held
applicable only to a line already constituting a lateral branch road.
United
States v. Baltimore & Ohio S. W. R. Co., 226 U. S. 14 (1921). The Act of
August 24, 1912, chap. 390, § II, 37 Stat. at L. 56o, 568, Comp. State., § 8569,
4 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 426, amending § 6 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, empowered the Commission to require railroads to establish physical
connection between their lines and the docks of water carriers; but the provision did not extend to connections between two rail lines."
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over the construction, extension, and abandonment of the
lines of carriers in interstate commerce, is that introduced
as 122 of §i, which excludes from its jurisdiction 'spur,
industrial, team, switching or side tracks, located wholly
within one state, or of street, suburban, or interurban electric railways, which are not operated as a part or parts of
a general steam railroad system of transportation.' It is
clear that the connection here in question is not a track of
this character. Compare Texas & P. R, Co. v. Gulf, C.
& S. F. Co., 270 U. S. :266 (1926). The proposed junction is between the main lines of the two railroads. The
point of junction is on the main line of the Alabama and
Vicksburg, near its entrance into the city of Jackson. In
support of the objection that a junction there would be dangerous, it was shown that the connection would be between
two trestles, near a highway crossing, on a curve, on a fill,
and within the flood area of Pearl River. The establishment of the junction at that point would, if the objection
is well founded, obviously imperil interstate commerce. The
fact that it may do so, shows that the jurisdiction of the
Commission over such connections must be exclusive, if the
duty imposed upon it to develop and control an adequate
system of interstate rail transportation is to be effectively
performed. Moreover, the establishment of junctions between the main lines of independent carriers is commonly
connected with the establishment of through routes and the
interchange of car services, and is often but a step toward
the joint use of tracks. Over all of these matters the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction." 95
5
Texas and P. R. Co. v. Gulf etc. R. Co., 270 U. S. 266 (1926), was a
suit by the Texas and Pacific to enjoin construction by the other road of the
"Hale-Cement Line' which would operate to divert traffic away from the objecting company which argued that the work could not go forward without the
certificate of the Commerce Commission, which had not been secured. With
this argument the Supreme Court agreed, holding that the 73/2-mile line into
new territory was an "extension."
Much of the case is given over to the question whether or not the decision
that the line is an extension is not an administrative question. Mr. Justice
McReynolds assented on the ground that it was and should go first to the Interstate Commerce Commission under the doctrine of the Abiline Cotton Oil Case,
204 U. S. 426 (19o7), which held that where reparation is sought on the theory
that rates charged were unreasonable the question of reasonableness cannot be
gone into by the court, but must first be decided by the commission. Under it
a guardianship of uniformity with respect to "fact!' has been committed to the
Commission, as explained in Gt. Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co.,

259 U. S. 293 (1922).
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State of Missouri ex rel. Wabash RailroadCompany v. Public Service Commission 91 involved an elaborate scheme for dealing with grade crossings, in the city of St. Louis, as to which the
road and the city were at odds on method. The Commission
made an order based on the city's plan, and the railroad sued to
enjoin its enforcement, objecting that the "indirect adoption of the
city's program calling for partial abandonment and relocation of
tracks is invalid as violating" the requirement of an Interstate
Commerce Commission certificate. In the State Supreme Court
the order stood. The Federal Supreme Court reversed on other
grounds.
Mr. Justice Stone for the Court said:
"While the Federal questions thus raised, so far as
they relate to the order now before fis, are not difficult of
solution, in view of the complexity of the facts to which the
principles announced by this court are to be applied, we cannot say that these questions are so unsubstantial as to deprive
us of jurisdiction to pass upon them and to make proper
disposition of the case as it is now presented. Erie R. R. v.
Public Util. Comm., 254 U. S. 394 (192i); Mo. Pac. Ry. v.
Omaha, 235 U. S. 121 (914); Denver & R. G. R. R. v.
Denver, 250 U. S. 241 (1919); R. R. Comm. v. Southern
Pac. Co., 264 U. S. 331 (1924). But we find it unnecessary
to decide these questions because of the situation which has
been created since the entry of the judgment below by the
enactment of the Railroad Clearance Act. Laws of Missouri of 1925, pp. 323, 324. That statute provides that
clearances over railroad tracks shall not be less than 22 feet,
'except in cases in which the Public Service Commission
finds that such construction is impracticable.' The state commission directed that the clearance at Delmar Boulevard
crossing be I8 feet, but it made no finding that the construction of a 22-foot clearance is impracticable. There is thus
presented a question of state law; the effect of this statute
upon the commission's order, the judgment of the state Supreme Court, and upon action taken pursuant to them.
"Ordinarily this court on writ of error to a state court
considers only federal questions and does not review questions of state law.
But where questions of state
"273

U. S. 126 (1927).
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law arising after the decision below are presented here, our
appellate powers are not thus restricted. Either because new
facts have supervened since the judgment below
or because of a change in the law

.

.

.

this court in

the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, may consider the
state questions thus arising and either decide them (Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450 [1864]), or remand the
cause for appropriate action by the state courts (Gulf, Col.
& S. F. Ry. v. Dennis, 224 U. S. 503 [1912]; Dorchy v.
Kansas, 264 U. S. 286 [1924]). The meaning and effect of
the state's statute now in question are primarily for the determination of the state court. While this court may decide
these questions, it is not obliged to do so, and in view of its
nature, we deem it appropriate to refer the determination to
the state court."
The readings by the lesser Federal courts of these cases show
a complete appreciation of the policy of unity. In Southern Railway Co. v. Shealy et al., Constitutingthe RailroadCommission of
South Carolina,97 the District Court of South Carolina, of three
judges, enjoined the enforcement of the state commission's order
directing the railway company to switch, receive and deliver
over side tracks at Union, South Carolina, carload freight tendered by a twenty-mile line whose existing arrangements at Union
were unsatisfactory to it. After a valuable discussion of the
whole topic the court said:
"Two very recent decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States are in point and appear to us to clear up
and settle beyond controversy the question at issue. In Alabama and Virginia Railroad Company v. Jackson and E. R.
Co., 271 U. S. 244 (1926), it was held that the jurisdiction
to determine whether a junction may be established between
main lines of two railroads, both engaged in interstate commerce as well as in local commerce, is exclusively in the
Interstate Commerce Commission" (etc.).
The latest case is that of United States and Interstate Commerce Commission v. New York Central Railroad Company.9"
While the case involved the right to require the railroad com0'78

F.(2d) 784 (D. C. S. C., 1927).
0s272 U. S. 457 (1926).
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pany to provide transportation service between the public terminals of the Erie Barge Canal at Buffalo and shippers located
along its tracks and along the lines of other railroads, with which
it could interchange traffic, and the placing and removal of cars
on the tracks within its terminals, the general provisions of the
TransportationAct were invoked. The conclusion of the court
was summed up as follows:
"The Commission having jurisdiction over the carriers
and the facilities by which the transportation is carried on,
the question is narrowed to whether its jurisdiction extends
to the entire current of commerce flowing through this terminal although intrastate in part. When we consider the
nature and extent of the commingling of interstate and intrastate commerce, and the difficulty of segregating the
freight passing through the terminal, we think it clear that
Congress in employing such broad language as 'the Commission shall have full authority to determine and prescribe
the terms and conditions upon which these connecting tracks
shall be operated' intended to confer upon the Commission
power to regulate the entire stream of commerce. Where
as here interstate and intrastate transactions are interwoven,
the regulation of the latter is so incidental to and inseparable from the regulation of the former as properly to be
deemed included in the authority over interstate commerce
conferred by statute. This was the view of the state court.
People ex rel. New York Central R. Co. v. Public Service
Commission, supra, 198 App. Div. 436, I9I N. Y. S. 636,
affirmed without opinion in

232

N. Y. 6oo (132 N. E. 904).

An interpretation of the statute which would in practice require the segregation of all shipments in interstate commerce would make compliance with the Commission's orders
impossible and defeat the purpose of the act.
"In the instant case the order of the state Commission
was comprehensive, including traffic of all kinds. No attempt was made to distinguish between intrastate and interstate commerce and under the authority last above cited,
because of the intermingling of interstate and intrastate
transactions, if the order be construed as applicable only to
the latter, its regulation is so incidental to and inseparable
from the regulation of the former as to bring the entire subject within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission."
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The reading by the state courts is so far conformable that in
the Barge Canal Case just referred to 19 both the inferior and the
ultimate New York courts 100 were agreed in checking the state
commission and in vacating its order.
The Illinois Supreme Court has gone farther than did the
Federal Court in Texas and New Orleans Belt Line v. North,
Side Belt Railway Company,' in recognition of the jurisdiction
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, accepting as did that
Commission itself in issuing its certificate at the time it did that
the proposed construction of the road whereon interstate carriage was intended to be conducted when the road was built, presented a proper exercise of the Interstate Commerce Commission's jurisdiction. It held that a suit in the state court to enjoin
the construction was in effect an attack upon the commission's
1
certificate and consequently dismissed it. 02
On the whole it seems a clearly appropriate remark, in conclusion, to say that, since the Federal Government is in a meas'Supra note 98.
"People ex re. N. Y. C. R. R. v. Public Service Commission, I9i N. Y.
S. 636 (192), 232 N. Y. 6o6, 134 N. E. 590 (1922).
10
Supra p. 402.
"The Interstate Commerce Commission authorized one of the appellees
to build a railroad in this state and the other to acquire and operate it. Although
the orders are permissive, the appellees have the right, under the provisions of
the Interstate Commerce Act above set forth, to do the things specified in the
Commission's orders. The instant suit is essentially one to annul or set aside
those orders, and the superior court was without jurisdiction to entertain it.
Wanting jurisdiction, the cause could not be determined upon its merits." It
relied upon Venner v. Mich. Cent. R. R., 271 U. S. 127 (1926).
In St. Louis Connecting Railroad Company v. Blumberg et a!., 156 N. E.
298 (1927), Blumberg sought to restrain the exercise upon his property of
eminent domain proceedings for right of way for a connecting link road.
Roy v. (Illinois) Commerce Commission, 322 Ill. 452, 153 N. E. 648 (i926),

was relied upon as on "all fours" and it resulted in victory for the plaintiff
because the court disagreed with the commission's judgment as to necessity for
the new link. The court admitted that "The facts in the Roy Case are very
similar to those of the present case, with, however, an important distinction,
appellant's right of way is sought for use in interstate commerce and it has
obtained from the Interstate Commerce Commission a certificate of necessity
and convenience and an order of that body authorizing it
bonds, construct the road (etc.). The vital question .

.

.

. to issue
is, therefore,

what effect must be given in the state courts to he" certificate and
order
t o
It answered the objection by considering that the question of whether the
property was taken for a public use was settled by the commission's order based
on a finding of public use and convenience, so far as the state court was concerned.
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ure the judge of its own case as between itself and the states, its
field of control will continue to be extended by its legislature and
its legislation will be accepted by its courts. Regulation is an established thing and the same impulse which establishes it will
insist upon its authoritativeness. The logic of the situation, more
than the mere urge to Federal aggrandizement, is what is driving
the states out of areas they once occupied and in which indeed
the Constitution seems to have imbedded them. But circumstances alter constitution readings as well as cases.

